The authors propose a simple behavioral economic model (BEM) describing how reinforcement and interval timing interact. The model assumes a Weber-law-compliant logarithmic representation of time. Associated with each represented time value are the payoffs that have been obtained for each possible response. At a given real time, the response with the highest payoff is emitted. The model accounts for a wide range of data from procedures such as simple bisection, metacognition in animals, economic effects in free-operant psychophysical procedures, and paradoxical choice in double-bisection procedures. Although it assumes logarithmic time representation, it can also account for data from the time-left procedure usually cited in support of linear time representation. It encounters some difficulties in complex free-operant choice procedures, such as concurrent mixed fixed-interval schedules as well as some of the data on double bisection, which may involve additional processes. Overall, BEM provides a theoretical framework for understanding how reinforcement and interval timing work together to determine choice between temporally differentiated reinforcers.
Choice and interval timing are two important areas of operant behavior that have remained relatively isolated from one another. Following the lead of B. F. Skinner (Skinner, 1938; Ferster & Skinner, 1957) , research on choice has focused on the role of "economic" variables (frequency and magnitude of reinforcement, etc.; see Williams, 1988 , for a review) while research on timing was approached early on from a psychophysical point of view (Catania, 1970; Dews, 1970; Gibbon, 1977) , which emphasized cognitively oriented questions such as the representation of time and the information-processing mechanisms governing temporal regulation of behavior (for some recent reviews see Church, 2004; Jozefowiez & Staddon, 2008; Staddon & Cerutti, 2003) . Choice researchers have ignored cognitive questions, while at the same time students of timing have underplayed the role of reinforcement. Yet it is clear that a complete theory of operant performance will require an integration of these two fields of research (see also Whitaker, Lowe, & Wearden, 2008) .
Interval timing, the ability of animals to adapt to temporal relations ranging from seconds to minutes between two events, has been observed in a wide range of species, from fish to humans (Lejeune & Wearden, 1991) . In pigeons at least, it has an automatic, almost reflex-like nature (Wynne & Staddon, 1988) , suggesting strong selection pressure at an evolutionary level, and hence a potentially key role in adaptive behavior. Indeed, according to some recent accounts (Cerutti & Staddon, 2004b; Gallistel & Gibbon, 2000; Grace, Berg, & Kyonka, 2006; Shapiro, Miller, & Kacelnik, 2008; Staddon & Cerutti, 2003; Staddon & Ettinger, 1989) , interval timing may play an important role in choice. Moreover, some of the procedures used to study timing are choice procedures, and, in some of them, reinforcement has been shown to influence psychometric properties of performance.
The most dramatic example of interaction between timing and reinforcement mechanisms comes from studies by Bizo and White (1994a , 1994b , 1995a , 1995b ) using a trial-based free-operant psychophysical procedure (see also Guilhardi, MacInnis, Church, & Machado, 2007; Machado & Guilhardi, 2000; Stubbs, 1980) . Pigeons were given the choice between two response keys. During the first 25 s of each 50-s trial, one key (say, the right key) was reinforced according to a variable-interval (VI) schedule x-s (a response on that schedule was reinforced on average every x s); responding on the other key had no effect. On the other hand, during the last 25 s of each 50-s trial, responding on the other key (say, the left key) was reinforced according to a VI y-s; responding on the other key had no effect.
The proportion of responding on the left key was a sigmoid function of time in a trial: The pigeons pecked on the right key early in a trial before switching to the left key later on. When the two VI rates were equal, x ϭ y, the point of indifference, where the proportion of responding on the left and right keys was .5, was at 25 s into a trial. It moved to the right if x Ͻ y (the animals stayed longer on the schedule associated with the higher reinforcement rate) and to the left if x Ͼ y (the animals switched earlier to the schedule associated with the higher reinforcement rate) even though manipulation of the reinforcement rate had no effect on the temporal properties of the situation and the transition point should have been easier to detect when x was increased.
The aim of this article is to introduce a model that can account for results such as those of Bizo and White (1994a , 1994b , 1995a , 1995b -that can explain how reinforcement and interval timing interact to produce performance in tasks with temporally differentiated reinforcers. For this reason, we term our timing model the behavioral economic model (BEM). For each value subjective time can take in a given situation, the animal associates a payoff for each response it can emit. (c) Response rule: These payoff functions determine the probability of emitting a response according to a maximizing response rule.
Let's take a simple example, a human being involved in a bisection task and equipped with a stopwatch. The subject is presented with two stimulus durations and must choose which of two buttons to press. If the stimulus is 10-s long, the subject receives 1 unit of reinforcer for pressing the left button; if the stimulus duration is 20-s long, the subject receives 1 unit of reinforcer for pressing the right button. How could the subject solve this task? At the beginning of a trial, the (say, male) subject starts the stopwatch that provides him with a noiseless external representation of time (the first assumption of BEM). When he is given an opportunity to respond (either at 10 or 20 s), the subject looks at the time recorded on the stop watch, emits a response, and records the amount of reinforcement he received for emitting that response at that particular time. In this way, he will learn that 10 s into a trial, the payoff for pressing the left button is 1 while the payoff for pressing the right button is 0; on the other hand, 20 s into a trial, he will learn that the payoffs are reversed: The payoff for pressing the right button is 1 while the payoff for pressing the left button is 0 (the second assumption of BEM; the subject learns payoff functions mapping, for each response, his representation of time onto an amount of reinforcement collected).
Finally, he can use that knowledge he has acquired about payoffs to determine which response should be emitted (the third assumption of BEM): Since 10 s into a trial the payoff for pressing the left button is higher than for pressing the right button, he should press the left button; on the other hand, since 20 s into a trial the payoff for pressing the right button is higher than for pressing the left button, he should press the right button.
The only difference between this example and the version of BEM detailed below is that, instead of a human being using a noiseless, linear, external representation of time, we are dealing with animals using a noisy, logarithmic, internal representation of time.
Representation of Time
Although there are a few exceptions (e.g., Bizo, Chu, Sanabria, & Killeen, 2006; Crystal, 1999; Zeiler & Powell, 1994) , research on interval timing generally agrees that the perception of time follows Weber's law (Church, 2004; Jozefowiez & Staddon, 2008; Staddon & Cerutti, 2003) : The differential threshold for a stimulus increases with its value (duration) in a roughly proportional way. From a descriptive-theory point of view (Falmagne, 1985) , this can be explained in two ways: (a) At real time t, subjective time f(t) is a random variable following a Gaussian law with either a mean equal to ln t and constant standard deviation (logarithmic representation with constant variability) or (b) with a mean equal to at and a standard deviation kat proportional to the mean (linear representation with scalar variability). In most situations, these two encoding schemes yield equivalent output upon decoding; however, for reasons we explain later, BEM requires an approximately logarithmic representation of time.
As described above, the logarithmic representation scheme assumes continuous subjective time. But, because we will later need to compute P͑x|t͒, the probability that the representation takes the value x at time t, while keeping the Weber-law property, we will use a discrete representation of time.
In a given situation, subjective time is drawn from a set X ϭ ͓x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x i , . . . , x n ͔. Each subjective time value x i is Figure 1 . Behavioral economic model (BEM) at a glance: (a) based on its perception of the stimulus, the animal emits the behavior which leads to the higher payoff; (b) but its perception is noisy; that is, (c) it follows Fechner's law; at objective time t, the representation of time is a random variable drawn from a Gaussian distribution with a mean equal to ln t and a constant standard deviation. tuned to a specific objective value t i so that, at time t i , the representation is more likely to take the value x i ϭ lnt i . We can achieve this by assuming that P͑x i |t i ͒, the probability that the representation takes the value x i at time t i , is equal to
where F͑x, m, d͒ is a Gaussian density function with mean m and standard deviation d while ε is the "grain" of the representation. For a given t i , Equation 1 reaches its maximum value for x i ϭ lnt i . The smaller ε, the closer we approximate continuous subjective time. For instance, Figure 2 
Payoff Function
At real time t into a trial, subjective time takes the value x, drawn from a Gaussian distribution with mean lnt and standard deviation . According to BEM, for every value x that the representation can take, the animal records the payoff Q͑x, b i ͒ for each response b i it can emit in this situation. In a given situation, the animal has a defined set of responses B ϭ ͓b 1 , . . . , b i , . . . , b m ͔ that it can emit. Each response b i is associated with a set T i ϭ ͓T i1 , . . . , T ij , . . . , T imi ͔ of times of reinforcement. Each time of reinforcement T ij is associated with (a) a probability of reinforcement p ij and (b) a set A ij ϭ ͓A ij1 , . . . , A ijk , . . . , A ijoij ͔ of possible outcomes; each outcome A ijk has a probability of occurrence P͑A ijk ͒ kϭ1 oij P͑A ijk ͒A ijk ϭ 1. Hence,
is the expected payoff for emitting response b i at time T ij .
Suppose subjective time has a value of x: What is the payoff for emitting response b i in this case? It will be R i1 if real time is T i1 ; R ij if real time is T ij ; and R imi if real time is T imi . Hence, if we note P͑t|x͒, the conditional probability that real time is equal to t when subjective time is equal to x, and remembering that, according to Bayes' theorem, P͑t|x͒ ϭ P͑t͒P͑x|t͒/P͑x͒, we have
Response Rule
The payoff functions are used to determine a subjective policy s that assigns a probability of emission to each choice response for each possible value of subjective time: Hence, s ͑x, b i ͒ is the probability of emitting response b i when subjective time is x. Various response rules could be used but we used the simplest: a straightforward winnertake-all maximization rule according to which s ͑x,
The subjective policy maps subjective time onto probability of responding, but in order to compare the model with data we need to know the objective policy r that maps real time onto probability of responding, that is, that gives us r ͑t, b i ͒, the probability of emitting response b i when real time is t. In a given situation, subjective time can take a value from set X ϭ ͓x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x i , . . . , x n ͔. At real time t, subjective time takes the value x with a probability P͑x|t͒ (Equation 1); when subjective time takes the value x, the probability of emitting response b i is s ͑x, b i ͒. Hence,
To summarize, the mathematics of BEM should not obscure the fundamental simplicity of the process: well-established Weber-law timing, a payoff function that maps onto subjective time, and a simple maximization response rule. For the purposes of fitting the model to data, there is only one free parameter, representing the noise in the time representation.
Simulations

Bisection Procedure
In a temporal bisection procedure (Church & Deluty, 1977; Stubbs, 1968) , the animal is presented with a duration stimulus at the end of which it is given a choice between two responses: If the stimulus was T 1 -s long, response b 1 will be reinforced; if the stimulus was T 2 -s long, response b 2 will be reinforced (T 1 Ͻ T 2 ). Once this discrimination is mastered, the animal is presented during unreinforced probe trials with test stimuli whose durations are intermediate between T 1 and T 2 : The probability of picking b 2 relative to the probability of picking b 1 is a sigmoid function of the test stimulus duration with an indifference point (bisection point) located at the geometric mean of the two training durations ͑ͱT 1 T 2 ).
The top panel of Figure 3 shows the BEM payoff functions for each response in a simulation of a bisection procedure where T 1 ϭ 20 s and T 2 ϭ 60 s (details of the equations for this and other simulations are given in the Appendix). The subjective policy is a straightforward step function: Response b 1 is emitted if subjective time is below x c (x c being the critical subjective time value for which the two payoff functions are equal) while b 2 is emitted if subjective time is above x c .
The bottom panel of Figure 3 shows the objective policy derived from the subjective one: As in the data (Church & Deluty, 1977; Stubbs, 1980) , the probability of picking b 2 is a sigmoid function of the test-stimulus duration with an indifference point located at the geometric mean between the durations of the two training stimuli.
As a consequence of Weber's law, performance in many timing tasks is timescale invariant (Gallistel & Gibbon, 2000) ; in other words, if the time-of-reinforcement distributions are identical in relative time, response curves superimpose when plotted in relative time. This is notably the case in the bisection procedure (Church & Deluty, 1977) , and Figure 4 shows that BEM captures timescale invariance as well. Objective policies have been computed for a bisection task where a 10-s stimulus is pitted versus a 30-s stimulus as well as for a bisection task where a 20-s stimulus is pitted against a 60-s stimulus. As can be seen, when plotted in relative time, the two predicted psychometric functions superimpose.
The Free-Operant Psychophysical Procedure
Although BEM makes specific predictions about how reinforcement and other non-timing variables should affect bisection performance, none of these predictions has been tested (see Jozefowiez, Polack, & Miller, 2009 , for a first attempt). Hence, let's turn to the Bizo and White (1994a , 1994b , 1995a , 1995b studies to test the way BEM assumes reinforcement and timing interact. To simplify exposition, we first apply the model to a simplified version of the BizoWhite procedure (see Figure 5) and show how the model accounts qualitatively for the results. Then we fit the model quantitatively.
In this version, the subject is presented with four stimulus durations: T 11 , T 12 , T 21 , and T 22 . In our simulation, the values of these intervals are chosen so that they are equally spaced on a logarithmic scale and, hence, are equally discriminable. The animal can emit two responses, b 1 and b 2 . Response b i is reinforced, with probability p ij , if the stimulus duration is either T i1 or T i2 ; thus response b 1 is reinforced during the two earlier durations T 11 and T 12 , with probabilities p 11 and p 12 , and similarly for response b 2 . Manipulating the VI interval in the Bizo and White (1994a , 1994b , 1995a , 1995b studies is equivalent to manipulating the probability of reinforcement at a given point in a trial. Hence, to see if BEM is able to account for the effects obtained by Bizo and White we ran several simulations where the stimulus duration values were held constant but the reinforcement probabilities were changed (see Table 1 ). In the "control" condition, the reinforcement probability for b 1 after T 11 and T 12 was equal to the reinforcement probability for b 2 after T 21 and T 22 . In the "bias b 1 " condition, the reinforcement for b 1 after T 11 and T 12 was higher than for b 2 after stimulus durations T 21 and T 22 . This was reversed in the "bias b 2 " condition. Figure 6 shows the results of these simulations. Manipulating the reinforcement probabilities affected the simulated probability of picking b 2 in a way consistent with the Bizo-White results: The psychometric curve shifted to the left in the "bias b 1 " condition (the animal stays longer on the side associated with higher reinforcement rate) and to the right in the "bias b 2 " condition (the animal switches earlier to the side associated with the higher reinforcement rate).
The explanation for these effects lies in the payoff functions. The top panel of Figure 7 shows the payoff functions for b 1 and b 2 in the control condition while the bottom panel shows those same functions in the "bias b 1 " condition where b 1 was more often reinforced: This higher reinforcement rate inflates the payoff function for b 1 , moving the critical subjective time value x c (at which the two payoff function are equal and then hence determines when the animal switches from b 1 to b 2 ) to the right. Figure 8 shows the results of the simulations once they are applied to the actual procedure studied by Bizo and White (1994a , 1994b , 1995a , 1995b instead of the bisection analogue shown in Figure 5 . To obtain those curves, we adjusted the only free parameter of the model (, the level of noise in the time representation; see Equation 1) in order to minimize the average difference between the empirical data and the predictions of the model. Despite its simplicity, the model provides a relatively good quantitative fit to the data.
In a follow-up study by Machado and Guilhardi (2000; see Guilhardi et al., 2007 , for a replication with rats), a trial lasted 60 s. As in the Bizo and White (1994a , 1994b , 1995a , 1995b studies, this interval was divided into two 30-s periods: During the first 30 s, one response (say, responding on the right key) was reinforced while the other response (say, responding on the left key) was reinforced during the last 30 s. But each period was itself divided into two periods: Although responding on the right key was reinforced from 0 to 30 s in a trial according to a VI, the VI interval from 0 to 15 s in a trial (Period 1) was different from the VI interval from 15 to 30 s in a trial (Period 2); in the same way, although responding on the left key was reinforced according to a VI from 30 to 60 s, the VI interval from 30 to 45 s in a trial (Period 3) was different from the VI interval from 45 to 60 s in a trial (Period 4). Machado and Guilhardi (2000) observed that the effects reported by Bizo and White (1994a , 1994b , 1995a , 1995b ) could be Figure 5 . A bisection analogue of the free-operant Bizo and White (1994a , 1994b , 1995a , 1995b psychophysical procedure. The animal can emit two responses, b 1 and b 2 . Response b i is reinforced at times T i1 and T i2 with A amount of reinforcer. The probability of reinforcement of response b i at time T ij is p ij . Each stimulus duration T ij has the same probability of occurrence during a session (.25). Table 1 Reinforcement Probabilities in the Simulation of the Bizo and White (1994a , 1994b , 1995a , 1995b . Reinforcement-probability effect on the probability of responding in a bisection analogue of the free-operant psychophysical procedure. Response 1 is reinforced after a stimulus lasting either 10 or 20 s. Response 2 is reinforced after a stimulus lasting either 40 or 80 s. In the control condition, the reinforcement probability for Response 1 and Response 2 is .25. In the bias b 1 condition, the reinforcement probability is .75 for Response 1 and .25 for Response 2. In the bias b 2 condition, this is reversed: The reinforcement probability is .25 for Response 1 and .75 for Response 2. ϭ 0.25.
obtained only if the reinforcement rates between Periods 2 and 3 differed. When they were equal, no effect was observed, no matter what the difference in reinforcement rate between Periods 1 and 4 (thus disconfirming the hypothesis that overall reinforcement rate is critical to temporal discrimination-testing this hypothesis was one aim of the Machado & Guilhardi study). We simulated Machado and Guilhardi's (2000) experiment using the bisection analogue of the Bizo-White procedure shown in Figure 5 . In addition to a control condition where the reinforcement probability was the same for all the responses and all the stimuli (see Table 2 ), we had two experimental conditions. In both conditions, the overall reinforcement rates for b 1 and b 2 were equal (p 11 ϩ p 12 ϭ p 21 ϩ p 22 ), but, contrary to the previous simulation, the two reinforcement probabilities associated with a response differed. In Condition 1, p 11 ϭ p 21 Ͻ p 12 ϭ p 22 , while in Condition 2, p 11 ϭ p 22 Ͻ p 12 ϭ p 21 . Figure 9 shows the simulated objective policies (probability of picking b 2 ) in these three conditions. It replicates the pattern found by Machado and Guilhardi (2000) : The policy in Condition 2, where p 11 ϭ p 22 , is identical to the one in the control condition, while in Condition 1, where p 12 Ͼ p 22 , the curves shift to the right. The explanation again lies in the payoff functions, which are shown in Figure 10 . In Condition 2 (see Figure 10 , top panel), the higher reinforcement probability for T 11 and T 22 inflates the values at the extremes, leaving the critical point where the two functions are equal unchanged. On the contrary, in Condition 2 (see Figure 10, bottom panel), the higher reinforcement probability for T 12 inflates the payoff function in the middle, switching the critical point where the two functions are equal to the right, with similar consequences on the subjective and objective policy.
Figures 11 and 12 show the quantitative fit of the model to Experiments 1 ( Figure 11 ) and 2 ( Figure 12 ) of Machado and Guilhardi (2000) . As for the Bizo and White (1994a , 1994b , 1995a , 1995b studies, was set so as to minimize the difference between the empirical data and the model's predictions. The pigeons' behavior corresponds closely to the BEM predictions.
Double Bisection
In an ingenious series of pigeon experiments, Machado and colleagues (Machado & Keen, 1999; Machado & Pata, 2003) explored the effects of a double-bisection procedure, that is to say two bisection procedures run concurrently: In the first task, response b 1 was reinforced after a 1-s stimulus while response b 2 was reinforced after a 4-s stimulus; in the second task, response b 3 was reinforced after a 4-s stimulus while response b 4 was reinforced after a 16-s stimulus. Bizo and White (1994a , 1994b , 1995a , 1995b data: Response 1 is reinforced during the first 25 s according to a VI x while Response 2 is reinforced during the last 25 s according to a VI y (the legend shows the value of x/y for each condition). The points are the actual pigeon data while the lines are the predictions of the model. ϭ 0.3 for all these simulations. Figure 7 . Reinforcement-probability effect on the payoff functions in a bisection analogue of the free-operant Bizo and White (1994a , 1994b , 1995a , 1995b On test trials, the subjects were presented with a stimulus whose duration varied between 1 and 16 s and were given the choice between b 2 and b 3 . Since both responses had been associated with a 4-s stimulus, most cognitive accounts would predict that the pigeons should be indifferent between the two keys, no matter what the duration of the test stimulus. That was emphatically not the case: The pigeons preferred b 3 early in a trial and b 2 later: The probability of picking b 2 was a positive function of the test stimulus duration, with an indifference point at 4 s. Indeed, it was very similar to the outcome of a bisection task pitting a 1-s stimulus versus a 16-s one. If, after being trained on the bisection, the pigeons are exposed to a 1-s versus 16-s bisection task, their performance is stable from the first session as if the 1-s stimulus is associated with b 3 and the 16-s stimulus with b 4 . Without this pre-training, it takes several sessions for the animal to reach this asymptotic performance (Machado & Arantes, 2006) . These results are captured by BEM. The top panel of Figure 13 shows the payoff functions for each bisection task studied by Machado and colleagues (Machado & Keen, 1999; Machado & Pata, 2003) . If the payoff functions for b 2 and b 3 are isolated and pitted against each other (see bottom panel, Figure 13 ), the objective policy they generate is the one described by Machado and colleagues (see Figure 14) , that is to say, the one you would expect from a 1-s versus 16-s bisection task with an indifference point at 4 s.
Metacognition
A surprising application of BEM is to experiments that are supposed to demonstrate the existence of metacognitive abilities in animals (see Staddon, Jozefowiez, & Cerutti, 2007 , for an earlier account). Metacognition, cognition about cognition, is supposed to be involved when we have to make judgments about our own cognitive processes (Metcalfe & Kober, 2005) . The typical example would be a student who knows how he or she will do in an exam even before he or she actually responds to the exam questions. Recently, Foote and Crystal (2007) claimed to have found evidence for metacognition in rats using a bisection procedure not unlike the one depicted in Figure 5 . The rats were trained to discriminate between two classes of noise duration: short (2 to 3.62 s)-press the left (say) lever, or long (4.42 to 8 s)-press the right lever. Correct responses got them six pellets of food. On test trials the animals were allowed to choose between a third option, a weakly reinforced (three pellets) sure-thing, versus one of the two test levers (a possible six pellets).
How does this procedure allow us to test for metacognition? Suppose a stimulus is shown and the rat "knows" which response is associated with it. If it has metacognitive abilities, then it should know that it knows and hence it should have no incentive to pick the weakly reinforced response. On the other hand, if the rat does not know which response is associated with the stimulus, it should know that it does not know and hence, might prefer in this case to select the weakly reinforced response rather than running the risk Figure 10 . Further effect of probability of reinforcement in a bisection analogue of the free-operant psychophysical procedure. Response 1 is reinforced after a stimulus lasting either 10 or 20 s. Response 2 is reinforced after a stimulus lasting either 40 or 80 s. Top panel: Payoff functions in Condition 1. The reinforcement probability for Response 1 and Response 2 is .25, whatever the stimulus. In Condition 1, the probability of reinforcement is .75 after a 20-s stimulus for Response 1 and after an 80-s stimulus for Response 2, while it is .25 after a 10-s stimulus for Response 1 and after a 40-s stimulus for Response 2. Bottom panel: Payoff functions in Condition 2. The probability of reinforcement is .75 after a 10-s stimulus for Response 1 and after an 80-s stimulus for Response 2, while it is .25 after a 20-s stimulus for Response 1 and after a 40-s stimulus for Response 2. ϭ 0.25. Figure 9 . Further effects of probability of reinforcement in a bisection analogue of the free-operant psychophysical procedure. Response 1 is reinforced after a stimulus lasting either 10 or 20 s. Response 2 is reinforced after a stimulus lasting either 40 or 80 s. In the control condition, the reinforcement probability for Responses 1 and 2 is .25, whatever the stimulus. In Condition 1, the probability of reinforcement is .75 after a 20-s stimulus for Response 1 and after an 80-s stimulus for Response 2, while it is .25 after a 10-s stimulus for Response 1 and after a 40-s stimulus for Response 2. In Condition 2, the probability of reinforcement is .75 after a 10-s stimulus for Response 1 and after an 80-s stimulus for Response 2, while it is .25 after a 20-s stimulus for Response 1 and after a 40-s stimulus for Response 2. ϭ 0.25.
of not getting any reinforcer at all (note that this reasoning assumes that the rats are risk-averse with regard to reward magnitude; otherwise, they should just be indifferent between the three levers as they all deliver the same average amount of reinforcement).
The "I don't know" choice is more likely for stimuli in the middle of the stimulus range, close to the point separating the two categories, than for stimuli on the fringe of the stimulus range that are far from the category boundary. Hence, if the rats have metacognition, they should be more likely to pick the weakly reinforced response for stimuli in the middle of the stimulus range (i.e., 3.62 or 4.42 s) rather then for stimuli at the fringe of the stimulus range (i.e., 2 or 8 s). This is exactly the result obtained by Foote and Crystal (2007) .
According to BEM, those results do not require the concept of metacognition and can be explained by familiar learning mechanisms. Consider the bisection task in Figure 5 : If all the reinforcement probabilities are set to 1, it is identical to the one used by Foote and Crystal (2007) except with fewer stimuli. Let's add a third response b 3 that is reinforced no matter the stimulus duration but with only half of the amount of reinforcer associated with the two other responses (A/2 instead of A). The payoff function for this response is A/2. As the top panel of Figure 15 shows, it is always less than or equal to the payoff function for the two other responses and so the model predicts that the animal should never pick b 3 .
But this is because we have assumed an identity relation between the objective amount of reinforcer an animal receives and the subjective value it represents. This is not a valid assumption, as it does not take into account the well-established fact of risk sensitivity. Under many conditions, when given the choice between an alternative delivering a fixed amount of reinforcer (say, 2 units) and one delivering a variable amount (say, either 1 or 3 units) that, on average, is equal to the amount by the fixed alternative, many animals (in particular some rats, but not pigeons, apparently) prefer the fixed alternative (Bateson & Kacelnik, 1995; Kacelnik & Bateson, 1996; Staddon & Innis, 1966 .) This is riskaversion (the reverse pattern is called risk-proneness).
Since Bernoulli proposed it nearly 300 years ago, the usual explanation for risk-aversion is a negatively accelerated utility function-the relation between objective amount of reward collected and subjective amount experienced is concave, showing diminishing marginal utility. To incorporate this into BEM, we need, in Equation 2, to replace A ijk , the objective amount of reward collected, with A ijk c , the subjective amount of reward experienced. c is a free parameter representing risk-sensitivity: If c ϭ 1, the animal is risk-neutral; if c Ͻ 1, the animal is risk-averse; if c Ͼ 1, the animal is risk-prone.
The bottom panel of Figure 15 shows how the values of b 1 , b 2 , and b 3 are affected once risk-sensitivity is taken into account. (Although the value of c has an impact on the payoff function, it has no influence on the optimal policy as long each response gets the same reinforcer, which is the case for all the simulations we discuss in this article except this one. Hence, we just set c to 1 for all the other simulations).
When risk-aversion is incorporated into BEM, there are some values of subjective time for which b 3 has a higher value than the two other responses. Those subjective time values are in the middle, and hence more likely to be associated with objective stimulus duration in the middle of the stimulus range. Indeed, the top panel of Figure 16 , which shows the probability of picking b 3 as a function of the test stimulus duration, shows a pattern identical to the one reported by Foote and Crystal (2007) : The closer a stimulus value is to the critical value separating the stimulus dimension into two classes, the higher the probability of picking b 3 . Moreover, as the bottom panel of Figure 16 shows, the model also correctly predicts that the animals will be more accurate in three-choice trials versus twochoice trials, although this increase in accuracy should be limited to the stimuli in the middle of the range. This effect was also reported by Foote and Crystal. Figure 17 shows how BEM quantitatively fits the data from Foote and Crystal (2007) . To obtain those fits, we first adjusted so as to predict accuracy on the forced-choice trials as well as possible (these predictions are not affected by the risk-sensitive parameter c). Then, we adjusted c so as to predict as well as possible tests declined by the rats (that is to say, the proportion of trials where the rats chose the weakly reinforced response). As can be seen, the fit to tests-declined is adequate (although BEM underestimates the proportion of trials where the rats should decline the test for the stimuli at the ends of the stimulus range). Contrary to the data shown in Figure 17 , the model predicts that, in this case, accuracy should have been higher for all stimulus durations when the weakly reinforced sure-thing response was available (a result even more suggestive of "metacognition," in fact).
Some studies of metacognition in animals (i.e., Smith, Shields, Allendoerfer, & Washburn, 1997; Washburn, Smith, & Shields, 2006) have used a procedure similar to the one used by Foote and Crystal (2007) but with visual instead of temporal discriminations. As long as the animal's perception of the stimulus is noisy (true for these visual discriminations), BEM's account of Foote and Crystal's data could be extended to these studies as well (see Jozefowiez, Staddon, & Cerutti, 2009 , for a fuller discussion of BEM's account of animal metacognition studies).
The Time-Left Procedure
As we said earlier, two time-representation schemes in the literature are compatible with Weber's law: logarithmic, with additive variability, and linear, with multiplicative (scalar) variability (see Figure 18 , top panel). Linear representation is at the core of the influential scalar expectancy model (SET; Gibbon, 1977; Gibbon, Church, & Meck, 1984) . SET postulates an internal pacemaker whose pulses are accumulated in short-term memory as the animal times an interval. At considerable cost in terms of theoretical parsimony (Staddon & Higa, 1999) , a linear representation with a variable (scalar) multiplier is the only pacemaker representation scheme compatible with Weber's law (unless one assumes that the pacemaker rate changes with the reinforcement rate as in Killeen & Fetterman's, 1988 , behavioral theory of timing, which entails additional complexities). An approximately logarithmic representation is assumed by the multiple timescale model (MTS; Staddon, 2005; Staddon & Higa, 1999) , which hypothesizes that the decaying short-term memory of the timemarker (the stimulus that starts the interval the animal is timing) forms the basis for the representation of time. On the basis of research on habituation and memory (Staddon, 2001; Higa, 1996), Staddon and Higa (1999) assumed that the strength of that short-term memory is a decaying sum-of-exponentials function of the time since the onset of the time-marker that is tuned to the prevailing to-be-timed interval. This process yields an approximately logarithmic time representation. The most tentative part of the MTS model was the response rule, which was a simple threshold. BEM can be thought of as a better and more comprehensive response rule that uses MTS (or perhaps some other approximately logarithmic) "clock" as its time-perception mechanism. Whether time is represented linearly or logarithmically can be decided only in relation to a particular model for the whole temporal-learning process. In fact, most of the time, for most models, the logarithmic and linear representation schemes do not lead to different empirical predictions (Falmagne, 1985) . But this is not the case for BEM, which provides an accurate account of the basic bisection procedure only if a logarithmic representation is assumed. The bottom panel of Figure 18 shows the probability of picking b 2 in a bisection procedure if a linear representation with scalar variability is used instead a logarithmic one with constant variability. As can be seen, one of the curves is not sigmoid and the indifference points are not located at the geometric mean. Thus, BEM requires a logarithmic representation.
The fact that the bisection indifference point is at the geometric mean was originally taken to support logarithmic time representation (Church & Deluty, 1977) . However, this result can be reconciled with a linear representation (Gibbon, 1981) . But there are in fact few data that favor linear over nonlinear time representation. Perhaps the most critical experiment is support of the linear hypothesis is the time-left procedure (Gibbon & Church, 1981) , to which we now turn.
The rather complex time-left procedure is depicted in Figure 19 . It is a variant of a concurrent-chain schedule and is divided into two parts. During the initial link, the animal (usually a pigeon, although a slightly different rat version exists too) is given the choice between two schedules, the standard side and the time-left side. Its choice has no consequence before T s in a trial has elapsed (T is determined randomly every trial according to a VI schedule): At that point, the procedure moves to the terminal link and the animal is committed to the schedule it was responding on at that moment (the other schedule becomes unavailable). If it is the standard side, responding on it will be reinforced S s later. If it is the time-left side, responding on it will be reinforced C Ϫ T s later. (S is the time-to-reinforcement on the standard side, timed from the moment the animal becomes committed to the standard side. C is the time-to-reinforcement on the time-left side, timed from the beginning of the trial. See Figure 19 .) Since S Ͻ C, the optimal performance is to respond on the standard side early in a trial and to switch to the time-left side later on. This is exactly the pattern found by Gibbon and Church (1981) . But Gibbon and Church (1981) argued further that the point of indifference, the time at which the animal is indifferent between the standard and time-left side, can tell us something about the form of the representation of time (linear versus logarithmic). According to their reasoning, the animal has a representation f(C), f(S), and f(t) of, respectively, C, S, and t (the time elapsed since trial onset). It constantly compares f(C) Ϫ f(t) (the time-toreinforcement on the time-left side if the transition to the terminal link takes place now) to f(S) (the time-to-reinforcement on the standard side if the transition to the terminal link takes place now) Figure 14 . Double bisection. The subjects were exposed to two bisection tasks simultaneously: Task 1 pitted a 1-s stimulus versus a 4-s one; Task 2 pitted a 4-s stimulus versus a 16-s one. They were then exposed to a test stimulus whose duration varied between 1 and 16 s and given the choice between the two responses reinforced after a 4-s stimulus: the one from Task 1 and the one from Task 2. The graph shows the probability of picking the former as a function of the duration of the test stimulus. The points are the pigeons' data from Machado and Pata (2003) . The line is behavioral economic model's predictions. ϭ 1.8. and picks whichever schedule is associated with the shorter timeto-reinforcement. At indifference, f(C) Ϫ f(t) ϭ f(S). Hence, if f is linear, the indifference point will be located at C Ϫ S s in a trial and be a function of the absolute value of both C and S. On the other hand, if f is logarithmic, the indifference point will be located at C/S s in a trial and be a function of the ratio between C and S, a highly paradoxical prediction. Gibbon and Church (1981) tested pigeons in various conditions, holding the C/S ratio constant (equal to 2) and found, contrary to their version of the logarithmic hypothesis-but consistent with an expectation based on a large corpus of timing data, and on SETthat the indifference point was a linear function of S.
This linear relation between duration and S is why the time-left procedure is considered to support linear-time representation, even though the indifference point is in fact not exactly as it predicted: Animals switch earlier than expected to the time-left side, a feature found in all subsequent replications of the time-left procedure (i.e., Cerutti & Staddon, 2004a; Preston, 1994) . Gibbon and Church (1981) attributed this deviation to "bias to the time-left side" but this explanation is ad hoc as they provide no independent justification for the bias. Moreover, the conclusion that an indifference point linearly related to S proves that the animal uses a linear representation holds only if the process underlying performance in the time-left procedure is indeed the kind of mental calculation postulated by Gibbon and Church, something for which there is no independent proof. Given different assumptions (i.e., Cerutti & Staddon, 2004a; Dehaene, 2001) , the time-left result can be explained even if time is represented nonlinearly.
We ran a BEM simulation in a series of conditions with parameters identical to those used in Gibbon and Church (1981) : The C/S ratio was held constant to 2 and S varied between four values (15, 30, 60, and 120 s). We adjusted the only free parameter of the model, so that the indifference point in the 30-s condition matched the one in Gibbon and Church (actually, instead of the actual indifference point, we used the value given by the regression line they fitted to it; the actual difference points were close to that line but there was some discrepancy). Figure 20 shows the results of the simulations. As in the data, the probability of picking the time-left side increases in all conditions according to a sigmoid function: The standard side is preferred early in a trial while the time-left side is preferred later on (these preferences are actually a bit extreme compared to the original Gibbon & Church data). The vertical lines indicate where the indifference points were in Gibbon and Church's study. Even though there are some discrepan- cies, the match is still quite close. More importantly, even though BEM uses a logarithmic representation, the indifference points are a linear function of S. Moreover, BEM correctly predicts that the animal will switch to the time-left side earlier than predicted by SET.
Matching
The study of free-operant choice began with Herrnstein's (1961) report of the approximate matching of response-rate and (obtained) reinforcement-rate ratios on concurrent schedules. The canonical procedure that yields matching is quite complicated: two (or more) choices each paying off with a variable-(usually random-) interval schedule, plus a changeover delay (COD). The COD ensures that the first switch (right-left [R L ] or left-right [L R ]) response is never reinforced. Instead a few seconds must elapse before a response to the switched-to alternative can be reinforced. Absent a COD, pigeons and rats tend to undermatch-show a choice proportion less extreme than the proportion of reinforcers received (Shull & Pliskoff, 1967; Todorov, Souza, & Bori, 1993; see review in De Villiers, 1977) . Thus, a discussion of COD should be included in any account of matching.
Does BEM predict matching in this situation, and if so, how? There are several aspects to this problem. First, matching is highly overdetermined; that is, on concurrent VI VI schedules, almost any reward-following strategy will yield an approximation to matching (Hinson & Staddon, 1983) , so it would be surprising if BEM were not at least compatible with matching. Second, BEM is a maximizing (optimality) model and matching is perfectly consistent with both molar and molecular maximizing. If we compare the overall payoff rate for different response allocations, then the T s into a trial, it is committed to the side it is responding on: If it is the standard side, reinforcement will occur S later; if it is the time-left side, it will occur C Ϫ T s later. The graph shows the proportion of responding on the time-left side as a function of time in a trial for various values of S corresponding to the one used by Gibbon and Church (1981) . The vertical lines show where the indifference points should be according to the regression line Gibbon and Church fitted to their data (0.74S ϩ 1.49). ϭ 0.3. maximum corresponds to matching, although the peak is flat and small deviations have little effect on overall payoff (Staddon & Motheral, 1978) . However, molar maximizing does not account for the effects of the COD or for systematic deviations from matching, such as undermatching.
At the molecular level, the earliest analysis was by Shimp (1966) , who noted that the payoff probability for an interresponse time on a VI schedule increases with its duration. If the COD (which enforces zero probability of payoff for a switch response) is ignored, then time taken to respond to one alternative automatically increases the payoff probability for a switch to the other. If the animal always chooses the response with the highest payoff probability (momentary maximizing), the result is a pattern of choices that yields an approximation to matching (Staddon, Hinson, & Kram, 1981) . Moreover, if the base response rate is relatively low, it always pays to switch (alternation). Hence, momentary maximizing can account for undermatching under some conditions. But again, the effects of the COD must be ignored.
Switching is critical to matching. The evidence is (a) that without explicit training in switching, animals maximize-choose the richer VI exclusively (Crowley & Donahoe, 2004; Gallistel & Gibbon, 2000) -and (b) that without a COD to suppress switching, subjects usually show extreme undermatching. With a COD, subjects match and the degree of matching is not very sensitive to the COD value-unless the COD is very long, in which case animals tend to fixate on the richer choice (De Villiers, 1977) .
If the response rate is relatively high, the payoff probabilities for responding to a given random-interval choice are more or less constant. But, because bout durations are typically quite a bit longer than interresponse times, the payoff probabilities for switching, R L and L R , do change as a function of the time since the last response on the switched-to side. The longer the time since the last L response, for example, the higher the payoff probability for an R L switch, and vice versa.
The probability of reinforcement as a function of time since the last response on a given key on a random-interval schedule is
where t L is the time since the last L response and is a parameter equal to the reciprocal of the mean time between VI "setups," that is, 1/VI value on the left. Choice (according to BEM) is determined by the value of each alternative: At a given time the higher valued alternative is chosen. Value depends on the amount, probability, and delay of reward
Assuming that the amount of reward is the same for each alternative, A i can be ignored; V thus depends on p and ␦. In order to incorporate the effects of the COD, we will assume (a) that a given delay devalues (probably according to a hyperbolic function [see Appendix], but the details are irrelevant to the matching account) the corresponding choice by a fixed fraction k, where 0 Ͻ k Ͻ 1, and (b) that value is just the product of probability and the delay devaluation. Thus, Equation 6 becomes
(k is not subscripted because COD is usually the same for switches in both directions).
The BEM prediction for the matching situation is that the animal switches from L to R (say) when the growing but delay-devalued probability of switching (responding on R) is equal to the constant probability for continuing to respond to L, that is, when
and similarly for switches R to L:
where R is just the VI rate on the R side and t L and t R are times since the last L and R response, respectively. An immediate prediction from Equations 8 and 9 is that if the COD delay is sufficiently large (k is sufficiently small) the animal should never switch, because the value of the other alternative can never rise above the value of the chosen alternative.
If t L and t R are small relative to the times between reinforcers on L and R, then we can replace the exponential function with the first couple of terms of the series expansion, ignoring terms in t 2 and above, which yields
which reduces to
and similarly for switches in the opposite direction:
But L and R are just the reinforcement rates on L and R (R L and R R ), and t L and t R are the times away from responding on L and R, respectively; in other words, under many conditions, they will be proportional to overall response rates on R and L: x R and x L . Thus, Equations 11 and 12 reduce to
which is matching. Thus, BEM predicts both matching and, when the COD value is large, exclusive choice on concurrent VI VI schedules. A more refined analysis, beyond the scope of this article, is necessary to explore the details of, for example, the parametric effects of COD and the factors that contribute to undermatching. We intend here just to show that matching and BEM are not inconsistent.
Limitations of the Model
BEM's strength lies in its simplicity and intuitiveness. As we have shown, this simple idea can explain the general-and in some cases, quite specific-features of data from a range of timediscrimination procedures. Nevertheless, the model has limitations and we give two examples below. In the first, the model fails because it assumes that behavior is solely controlled by timing and reinforcement. Data from our own laboratory indicate that this is not always the case, and BEM fails to account fully for them. In the second, the model seems to fail because it assumes that organisms are ideal optimizers, which is, of course, not the case (see, for instance, Wynne & Staddon, 1988) . Jozefowiez, Cerutti, and Staddon (2005) exposed pigeons to a concurrent fixed-interval (FI) 20-s FI 60-s schedule. Representative data are shown in Figure 21 : The pigeons start responding on the FI 20-s before switching to the FI 60-s later in a trial. Two important features of these data are that (a) the early peak in responding takes place well before 20 s in a trial have elapsed and (b) that response allocation is more efficient for the FI 20-s than for the FI 60-s: The relative response rate on the FI 20-s at the initial peak in responding is higher than the relative response on the FI 60-s late in a trial. Figure 22 shows simulations with BEM for various values of . BEM correctly predicts the shift to the right in the response peak on the FI 20-s and the fact that the proportion of responding allocated to the FI 20-s around 20 s is higher than the proportion of responding allocated to the FI 60-s at 60 s into a trial. But overall, if the shape of the curve is close enough to the one displayed by subject no. 17201 in the bottom panel of Figure 21 , it seems unlikely than the model is able to match performance by a subject such as no. 1239 in the top panel of Figure 21 . First, the U-turn displayed in this subject's data cannot be replicated by BEM unless the response rule is changed. Second, increasing sigma does not reduce the value of the initial peak in responding; it simply shifts it more to the left while making the response curve look even less like the data.
Concurrent Fixed-Interval and Mixed Fixed-Interval Schedules
The discrepancy between model and data is larger with the second series of studies by Jozefowiez, Cerutti, and Staddon (2006) on concurrent mixed FI schedules. The general procedure is displayed in Figure 23 : Reinforcement was available on one schedule t1 and t3 s into a trial and on the other t2 and t4 s into a trial (t1 Ͻ t2 Ͻ t3 Ͻ t4). In Experiment 2, the four times of reinforcement were distributed geometrically: Hence, since time discrimination follows Weber's law, each should be discriminated equally well. The results are displayed in the top panel of Figure 24 . The animals clearly perceived when a reinforcer was delivered; witness the switching-back-and-forth pattern between the two schedules with clear peaks in relative response rate at the times of reinforcement and with indifference points located at the geometric mean between two successive times of reinforcement.
But, if the pigeons seemed to know clearly when a reinforcer was delivered, they seem to have more and more difficulty remembering where it was delivered, as the proportion of responding driven by a reinforcer to its side decreases with time in trial: The first time of reinforcement drove about 80% of responding to its side, the second time of reinforcement 70%, and the third time only 60%. This successive decline in choice efficiency ends at the fourth time of reinforcement whose side-allocation proportion was close to that of the third one.
The bottom panel of Figure 24 shows simulations by BEM of the procedure described in Figure 23 . The model captures several essential features of the data but falls short of an exact fit. On the plus side, BEM predicts the very good temporal regulation of behavior in this situation, with relative-response-rate peaks at the times of reinforcement and indifference points at the geometric means. It also predicts that the magnitude of these peaks will not be identical despite the geometrical distributions of the times of reinforcement: The first peak has the higher amplitude, followed by the last one; the two intermediate times of reinforcement are last. But, the model does not predict the amount of decrease in peak amplitude observed in the data: The second peak has a smaller amplitude than the first one but it is equal to the amplitude of the third one; the amplitude of the last peak is higher than that of the third one.
BEM fares worse in Jozefowiez et al.'s (2006) Experiment 1, where the four times of reinforcement were distributed arithmeti- cally (t Ϫ 2t Ϫ 3t Ϫ 4t) and t varied across three conditions (it was equal to 10 s in the "short" condition, 20 s in the "medium" condition, and 40 s in the "long" condition). The results are displayed in the top panel of Figure 25 : There was strong control over performance by the first time of reinforcement although that control decreased as the value of t was increased (a clear violation of timescale invariance; see Jozefowiez et al., 2006 , for a discussion of the implications); otherwise, only the last time of reinforcement displayed some control over the performance.
The bottom panel of Figure 25 shows the simulations of that study with BEM for the "short" condition. The one thing BEM got right is the general pattern of the data: The animal starts on the side associated with the first time of reinforcement and then switches to the other schedule so that overall, only the first and the last time of reinforcement seem to have any influence on behavior. But the proportion of responding allocated to the side associated with the last time of reinforcement is too large. Moreover, the model predicts that the indifference point should be located before the second time of reinforcement while, in the data, it located around the third time of reinforcement. Finally, it is unable to account for the decrease in the control by the first time of reinforcement over performance as t is increased: The data are not shown in the graph but, if t is changed and response curves are plotted in relative time, simulated (but not actual) performance is timescale invariant.
In retrospect, the failure of BEM can be anticipated from the conclusions Jozefowiez et al. (2006) drew from these experiments. They concluded that timing and reinforcement alone were not sufficient to account for choice data in pigeons; other variables and processes must also play a role. For instance, impaired assignmentof-credit (deciding which response is actually responsible for the delivery of the reinforcer; see, for instance, Staddon & Zhang, 1991; Sutton & Barto, 1998) could explain the decrease in relative response rate peak magnitude with absolute time of reinforcement observed in both of Jozefowiez et al.'s studies. If reinforcement is delivered, say, 10 s into a trial on the left, the animal will not have had time to emit too many responses on the right and so should remember very well which response was reinforced, resulting in a strong "left" response allocation. On the other hand, if reinforcement is delivered later, say, 90 s into a trial, the animal will have emitted a lot of responses and received several reinforcers on both sides and, because of proactive interference, its memory of which response actually led to reinforcement should be blurred, resulting in a weak response allocation.
Because the controlling variables modeled in BEM are only timing and reinforcement, it is not surprising that it failed on these free-operant choice procedures, where the assignment-of-credit problem is much more difficult than in trial-by-trial procedures. The interesting point BEM makes is that some, if not all, of the effects observed by Jozefowiez et al. (2005 Jozefowiez et al. ( , 2006 can be explained by timing and reinforcement alone. For instance, timing and reinforcement alone explain why there is a decrease in the amplitude of the relative response rate peaks in Jozefowiez et al.'s (2006) Experiment 2. But another, unknown process, maybe response credit assignment, is necessary to account for the pattern observed by Jozefowiez et al. (2006;  note, for instance, that if a third process leading to a decrease in relative response rate amplitude with absolute time of reinforcement is added to BEM, it explains why the third and the fourth peaks of the data plotted in Figure 24 are about identical; without the third process, the fourth peak has a much higher amplitude than the third one). Because we feel not enough data have been gathered on this issue to allow for proper modeling, we decided not to try to modify BEM so that it fits the data and just acknowledge its limitations.
Double Bisection
Another challenge to BEM comes from the data by Machado and Keen (1999) and Machado and Pata (2003) on double bisection, discussed earlier. The pigeons learn two bisection tasks simultaneously: one pitting, say, a 1-s stimulus versus a 4-s one and the other pitting, say, a 4-s stimulus versus a 16-s one. We showed that BEM could account for the paradoxical behavior of pigeons given the choice between the two 4-s stimuli following sample stimuli of different durations. But there are other aspects of those data that BEM cannot account for so easily.
Consider the upper panel of Figure 13 : It shows the payoff function for each response in the two bisection tasks. The bottom panel of Figure 13 shows the payoff functions for the two 4-s responses, which would determine the policy when the animal is given the choice between those two responses. But now, suppose you give the animal the choice between the 1-s stimulus and the 16-s stimulus. As the top panel of Figure 13 shows, the payoff functions for the two responses associated with those two stimuli cross exactly at the same point as the two payoff functions for the responses associated with the 4-s stimuli. Hence, BEM predicts the performance of the pigeons given the choice of 1-s and 16-s stimuli should be identical to their performance given the two 4-s stimuli. Machado and Keen (1999) and Machado and Pata (2003) found that the performance was somewhat asymmetric, the preference being more extreme when the pigeons were given the choice between the 1-s and 16-s stimuli then when given the choice between the two 4-s stimuli. Now suppose you give to the pigeons the choice between the 1-s stimulus and the 4-s stimulus that was pitted against the 16-s one. Figure 26 shows the payoff functions for the responses associated with these stimuli: The payoff function for the response associated with the 4-s stimuli is always above the one associated with the 1-s response. Hence, BEM predicts that the animal should always prefer the 4-s stimulus over the 1-s one. This is not quite what Machado and Keen (1999) and Machado and Pata (2003) found: As the duration of the test stimulus was increased, the preference for the 4-s stimulus also increased, reaching a peak around 4 s-but then it decreased. BEM probably fails here because it describes the behavior of an ideal optimizer: For values on the far left and right of Figure 26 , the payoff functions for both responses are almost equal and the differences between them are very small. Yet the model assumes that organisms are able to perceive these differences, which is, of course, unlikely. If animals behave like optimizers, as they seem to in many situations, they are more often showing an approximation of optimality rather than an ideal case.
Conclusion
We have described a simple behavioral economic model (BEM), which integrates the effects of reinforcement and temporal contingencies. It relies on three principles: (a) The animal has a logarithmic representation of time. In contrast to other models of timing, BEM does not make any assumption about the mechanism generating this representation, just about its mathematical properties; hence, it is incompatible with models assuming a linear representation (like SET; Gibbon, 1977; Gibbon et al., 1984) as opposed to models assuming an approximately logarithmic representation (such as MTS; Staddon & Higa, 1999) . (b) For each value subjective time can take in a given situation, the animal associates a payoff for each response it can emit in that situation. (c) These payoff functions determine the probability of emitting a response through a winner-take-all rule (the behavior associated with the higher payoff is emitted).
Despite its simplicity, this model is able to account for a wide range of data, from the basic bisection procedure to "metacognition" through economic effects on the psychometric function in the free-operant psychophysical procedure and paradoxical choice in double-bisection procedures. Even though a logarithmic representation of time is at its core, it is able to account for results from the time-left procedure, which were claimed to prove that the representation of time is linear.
The limits of the model are shown when applied to free-operant concurrent FI and mixed FI schedules, where, although major features of the data are captured by BEM, the model is unable to account for some details. This might be because first, as argued by Jozefowiez et al. (2006) , a full model of choice behavior requires more than reinforcement and timing, the only two processes incorporated in BEM, and because second, the model assumes that animals are ideal and perfect optimizers, which of course they are not. More research would be necessary to go beyond these limits of the model.
All in all, the most valuable property of BEM is that it provides a framework to understand the interaction between reinforcement and timing. Few other models of timing do that. Most of them (for instance, SET: Gibbon, 1977; Gibbon et al., 1984; MTS: Staddon & Higa, 1999 ; the packet theory of timing: Kirkpatrick, 2002) provide little role for reinforcement and so are unable to account for most of the data presented in this article. The behavioral theory of timing (BET; Killeen & Fetterman, 1988) assumes an internal pacemaker, just like SET, and a limited role for reinforcement, as the reinforcement rate is supposed to control the rate of the pacemaker. This allows BET to account for the results from the Bizo and White (1994a , 1994b , 1995a , 1995b studies, but, as we showed (see also Machado & Guilhardi, 2000) , it is possible to provide a much simpler explanation for these results. Moreover, such an assumption cannot account for the results such as those by Machado and Guilhardi (2000) , which showed a shift in the psychometric function even though the reinforcement rate was held constant through conditions.
The timing model most similar to BEM is Machado's (1997) learning-to-time (LeT) model. Indeed, overall BEM and LeT can account for exactly the same experimental results (LeT has not been applied to studies on metacognition or to the time-left procedure but we suspect it would account for them successfully; we conducted some simulations that showed that LeT has the same problems as BEM when trying to account for behavior in concurrent FI and mixed FI schedules). This is not surprising as there are some conceptual similarities between the two models. LeT is a one-layered feedforward neural network using a Bush-Mosteller learning rule (Bush & Mosteller, 1955) to fix the weights between the input and the output layers, and BEM can be conceived in the same way: Each unit of the input layer would correspond to a subjective time value, and the payoff function value for a given response for a specific subjective time value would be the connection weight between that subjective value and the output unit representing that response. If a Bush-Mosteller learning rule is used to update those weights in an iterative fashion, their asymptotic values would converge on the one given by Equation 3.
Hence, the main difference between BEM and LeT seems to be the kind of time representation they postulate. In LeT, each unit in the input layer is a leaky integrator whose output is used as the input for the next integrator in the layer; the first integrator receives an input when the time-marker is presented, and the deeper an integrator is in the layer, the longer it takes for its activation to dissipate (see Staddon & Higa, 1996 , 1999 , for a similar idea in MTS). As a consequence, the representation of time in LeT is deterministic and vectorial: A specific objective time maps onto a specific activation vector. In contrast, the representation of time in BEM is stochastic and logarithmic: A specific objective time maps onto a single subjective value and, on subsequent trials, that value might be different.
Also, the kind of time representation used by LeT does not intrinsically respect Weber's law: As in BET, Machado (1997) has to assume that the rate of decay of the integrators composing the input layer is proportional to the reinforcement rate in order to be able to account for the timescale invariance properties of timed behavior. But otherwise, there are many convergences between BEM and LeT, and results such as those on paradoxical choice by Machado and Keen (1999) , Machado and Pata (2003) , and Machado and Arantes (2006) lead us to think that those associative models are more promising than old all-cognitive models such as SET, which assume a kind of Platonic knowledge of the time at which reinforcement is delivered. Several lines can be followed to expand BEM both empirically and theoretically. On an empirical level, many straightforward predictions about the impact of the manipulation of non-timing variables on behavior in the timing procedure can be derived from BEM, and we plan to explore them experimentally in the near future (i.e., Jozefowiez, Polack, & Miller, 2009 ). We will also focus on the problems BEM had in accounting for concurrent FI and mixed FI procedures by comparing behavior in these procedures to behavior in their non-freeoperant analogue, where BEM is more successful. On a theoretical level, it will be interesting to see if BEM can be applied to simple schedules and beyond, to complex Pavlovian conditioning procedures such as occasion setting.
